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| Moscow's image problem Viktor Erofeyev Published: January 21, 2007 MOSCOW: Who's to blame for the fact that Russia's image in the West has reached a catastrophic low? There are diametrically opposed positions about this in the Kremlin in the West. In fact, it's possible to start speaking of a new cold war — an image war. The Kremlin views itself as the victim of aggression, with the Western media leading the charge. Put differently, the Kremlin might claim that the West has set loose a pack of young and vicious dogs — its new allies among the former republics and satellites of the Soviet Union — against Russia, and they've raised a loud bark while their masters stand to the side contentedly rubbing their hands. In general, the Kremlin is indignant and humiliated to the depth of its soul, like a child. It didn't do anything bad! Nothing bad? Now the West is indignant. Who's using gas to twist the arms of its neighbors — Georgia, Ukraine and now Belarus? Who's conducting an ethnic cleansing campaign against those same Georgians? Who killed the independent journalist Anna Politkovskaya and poisoned Alexandre Litvinenko before the eyes of the world? Who's playing a double game in Iran? Point by point, the Kremlin rejects all the accusations. It did not abuse its neighbors — these were purely commercial issues, and moreover on territory that lies within Russia's sphere of interest. The assassinations were obviously useful to the Kremlin's enemies, and were apparently ordered by political émigrés. And so on. All the same, the Kremlin is ready to do everything to improve its image. It will spend millions on huge public-relations campaigns. According to unofficial sources, the Kremlin spent $15 million on PR at the Group of 8 summit meeting in St. Petersburg in 2006. This week there's talk of allocating $11 million for the rehabilitation of Gazprom after its successful gas war with President Aleksandr Lukashenko, which so scared European customers. The world will once again be convinced that Russia is not only Gazprom, but also wonderful tennis, wonderful musicians, wonderful ballet; that it is the homeland of Kandinsky, Dostoevsky, Rachmaninoff, Pasternak. Indeed, there is such a Russia, and nobody has a quarrel with it. But why always hide behind it? The current image conflict has two sources, political and psychological, linked to the historical values of the Russian nation. Already by the end of Yeltsin's rule, Russians had become disenchanted with the West, now perceived as unfaithful and suspect. The Kremlin began searching for a Russian national idea. Putin inaugurated an era of order, which Russia badly needed, and the nation began longing for the return of the lost status of a great and authoritative country. This was somewhat premature, but the inflow of petrodollars, the rise of a middle class and the growth of a consumer society convinced the authorities that it was possible. Russia had never been as rich as it was now — this may have been largely luck, but it is a fact and the population supports Putin in overwhelming numbers. This might be so bad had Putin found it possible to join with the democratic elite that arose under perestroika, but he holds them responsible for the chaos and loss of prestige under Yeltsin. So he summoned what he regards as an incorruptible force — his comrades from the KGB — to combat the oligarchy, the mafia, the corruption, the moral, social and economic crisis. He also called on the Orthodox Church as a potential source of moral rebirth. It's not surprising, then, that anti-Western forces have gained strength, dreaming of recreating the empire. This has led to a new messianism based on the old dream of Holy Russia. And it's understandable that a sharp conflict has arisen with the measured, rationalistic West, which naturally fears an unpredictable Russia and rushes to defend Russia's neighbors. The weakness of the current Russian policy is not that it fails to defend national interests, but that the Russian imperial discourse — the desire to speak from strength — is in principle not translatable into other languages. It provokes only irritation. When influential Russian nationalists believe that the West hates us because we're holy, and that everybody over there is Satanic, it distinctly smacks of fundamentalism. Obviously, a quiet strategist like Putin would prefer not to have anti-Georgian pogroms or killings of political opponents. But if the vector of Russian politics is assuming a nationalistic, anti-Western character, that means Putin is washing his hands of it. It means that Russians will be forever searching for Western plots; it means that Russians will have to abandon universal values and accept a situation in which domestic riff-raff regard it their duty to kill those they don't like. Russia is tired of being lectured to by the West, and the West is tired of Russian scandals. The image war is a form of deep mutual disenchantment, which can be overcome only by a new generation of Russian leaders. Viktor Erofeyev is a Russian writer. This article was translated from the Russian by the IHT. |
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